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Abstract
Background: National/social health insurance schemes have increasingly been seen in many low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) as a vehicle to universal health coverage (UHC) and a viable alternative funding mechanism for 
the health sector. Several countries, including Ghana, have thus introduced and implemented mandatory national 
health insurance schemes (NHIS) as part of reform efforts towards increasing access to health services. Ghana 
passed mandatory national health insurance (NHI) legislation (ACT 650) in 2003 and commenced nationwide 
implementation in 2004. Several peer review studies and other research reports have since assessed the performance 
of the scheme with positive rating while challenges also noted. This paper contributes to the literature on economic 
and political implementation challenges based on empirical evidence from the perspectives of the different category 
of actors and institutions involved in the process. 
Methods: Qualitative in-depth interviews were held with 33 different category of participants in four selected district 
mutual health insurance schemes in Southern (two) and Northern (two) Ghana. This was to ascertain their views 
regarding the main challenges in the implementation process. The participants were selected through purposeful 
sampling, stakeholder mapping, and snowballing. Data was analysed using thematic grouping procedure.
Results: Participants identified political issues of over politicisation and political interference as main challenges. 
The main economic issues participants identified included low premiums or contributions; broad exemptions, poor 
gatekeeper enforcement system; and culture of curative and hospital-centric care. 
Conclusion: The study establishes that political and economic factors have influenced the implementation process 
and the degree to which the policy has been implemented as intended. Thus, we conclude that there is a synergy 
between implementation and politics; and achieving UHC under the NHIS requires political stewardship. Political 
leadership has the responsibility to build trust and confidence in the system by providing the necessary resources 
and backing with minimal interference in the operations. For sustainability of the scheme, authorities need to review 
the exemption policy, rate of contributions, especially, from informal sector employees and recruitment criteria of 
scheme workers, explore additional sources of funding and re-examine training needs of employees to strengthen 
their competences among others.
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Implications for policy makers
• Within the context of this study, addressing the political and economic challenges of the national health insurance schemes (NHIS) in Ghana 
requires a policy review of the exemption policy to make it more target-specific. This has the potential of ensuring those who really cannot afford 
get services. 
• Contributions from both formal and informal sector employees also need to be marginally adjusted upward including the introduction of some 
percentage of taxes on alcohol and tobacco products as is done in countries such as Belgium and the United Kingdom and the proceeds channelled 
into the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) as additional sources of funding. 
• It is also the view of this study that the government may consider options such as reviewing the health insurance levy upwards by at least 1.5%-2.0% 
as a way of matching revenue with increased utilisation and membership. As a way of ensuring affordability and equity, some percentage of the 
health sector budget support could be used to extend coverage for the exempt groups and subsidize the other groups.
• Dealing with the political challenges requires policy-makers to ensure that recruitment into the scheme reflects competence and experience rather 
than other considerations such as political affiliation as a way of dealing with the capacity challenges confronting the scheme.
• It is also the view of this study that policy-makers consider adopting measures including making advance payments of a percentage of submitted 
claims by service providers as a way of minimising the reimbursement delay challenges to forestall providers running out of stock and consumables.
Implications for the public
The study demonstrates that the economic challenges in particular have serious consequences in relation to the public being ready to enrol and renew 
their membership of the scheme. Inability to reimburse service providers on time mean that sometimes card-bearing members of the public are turned 
away. Threats of suspension of services by service providers also create anxiety and uncertainty for the public.  Overall, this has an implication for the 
health seeking behaviour of the population.
Key Messages 
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Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpi nings of the politics of 
global health. We cl im that Ooms is i directly submitting to  liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global ealth as a question of individual morality. Drawing on he theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding m dical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a cas  we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, throug  political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of p wer in global health, Gor k Ooms mphasizes he nor ative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it com s to advocacy.1
We commend the eff rt to reinstate power an  politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empiric l evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the d mensi n of 
antagon s whic  I tak  to be c nstitutiv  of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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Background
National/social health insurance schemes have increasingly 
been seen in many low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) as a vehicle to universal health coverage (UHC) 
and a viable alternative funding mechanism for the health 
sector.1-3 Several countries, including Ghana have thus 
introduced mandatory national health insurance schemes 
(NHIS) as part of reform efforts towards increasing access to 
health services; and are at different stages of implementation. 
While mandatory contributions to NHIS are preferable, 
it is a major challenge to implement in countries with 
large informal sectors4 such as Ghana. The move towards 
national health insurance (NHI) aims at enforcing social 
equalisation, reducing out-of-pocket (OOP) payment and 
increasing access to healthcare.1,5 As De Allegri et al argue, 
the concept of insurance is applied at the micro-level to 
facilitate access to care and offer financial protection against 
the cost of illness, by favouring community resource pooling 
and risk-sharing.6 While health insurance schemes seek to 
achieve these, researchers have also drawn attention to the 
challenges of implementation developing countries face.7 In 
the literature, three major challenges including: collection 
of revenue, financial risk management, and spending of 
resources on service providers have been identified.8 Within 
the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, five broad challenges: (i) 
lack of clear legislative and regulatory framework; (ii) low 
enrolment rates; (iii) insufficient risk management measures; 
(iv) weak managerial capacity; and (v) high overhead costs6 
have been noted. These hamper the successful development 
of various health insurance systems, especially, community-
based schemes yielding negative effects on potential progress 
towards increased access to care and improved financial 
protection.6 Other challenges include weak institutional 
capacity for effective management, ineffective or unenforced 
regulatory mechanisms, rigid administrative procedures, 
and entrenched customs and practices that are difficult to 
change.7 Furthermore, there is increasing body of literature 
on the technical challenges of implementing health insurance 
in LMICs.9-12 In a study of national health insurance (NHI) 
policy implementation challenges in Nepal, for instance, 
financial viability has been mentioned as one major factor to 
achieving a more comprehensive NHI system.4
In the specific context of Ghana, while much has been achieved 
in relation to dealing with the implementation challenges 
there has been failure to recognize and deal effectively with 
the political12 and economic challenges in the implementation 
of the scheme. In this study, we seek to contribute to previous 
studies on political and economic challenges confronting the 
implementation of NHIS in LMICs. We do this by presenting 
an internal view from the perspectives of the key actors 
involved in the process based on the context-specific case of 
Ghana. This study could help policy-makers and insurance 
scheme managers design approaches to deal with the economic 
and political challenges. This, we hope, would improve the 
operations of the scheme as it provides information from their 
perspectives. Above all, the study will not only interest others 
pursuing UHC through these mechanisms but also provide 
useful lessons to consider context-specific factors in order to 
avoid some of these challenges.
Summary of the Main Elements of Ghana’s National Health 
Insurance Scheme
Ghana passed mandatory NHI Act (Act 650 of 2003, which 
has since been amended by Act 852 of 2012). Nationwide 
implementation commenced in 2004 via decentralised 
district-wide mutual health insurance schemes (DMHISs). 
The health insurance scheme was an effort at reducing 
impoverishment and catastrophic health expenditure. Clearly, 
it was an acknowledgment that the then system of healthcare 
(cash and carry) could not fully identify and protect the poor, 
vulnerable, children, aged, and other marginalised groups in 
the Ghanaian society. Thus, the main goal of the NHIS is to 
make healthcare affordable to all by removing OOP payment 
at the point of service, and to achieve equity of access based 
on need, rather than ability to pay.1,12,13 
The scheme is financed from several sources including 
earmarked tax (2.5% value added tax – hereafter referred 
to as VAT), 2.5% of the 17.5% of formal sector employees’ 
contribution to Social Security and National Insurance Trust 
(SSNIT), budgetary allocation, donations, investments, grants 
and annual contributions from informal sector employees 
and formal sector employees who do not contribute to 
SSNIT. Membership is open to all residents of Ghana upon 
subscription to the scheme (exception being Ghana armed 
forces and police service, and those with proof of holding a 
private health insurance scheme).14 The 2013 annual report of 
the NHIA, however, noted the addition of three categories of 
membership comprising Ghana police, military and security 
services. This three categories constitute 0.1%, 0.2%, and 
0.003%,15 respectively, of total membership as of December 
2013. Enrolment entitles members to comprehensive benefits 
package covering over 95% of both inpatient and outpatient 
services of all common illnesses in Ghana. 
Since implementation, several studies have examined the 
working of the NHIS. For instance, some studies have shown 
dramatic increases in patient utilisation of health services 
and coverage , especially, by the poor and the disadvantaged 
in Ghana following the introduction of the NHIS.13,16 Such 
increases in utilisation have, however, not only put pressure 
on the available facilities in hospitals but also pose serious 
challenges to managers of hospitals as increases in workload; 
over-stressed staff, have affected quality of care.1,17,18 A number 
of studies report greater accessibility and fairly high levels of 
satisfaction with the system.19-22 Equity in healthcare through 
the NHIS of Nigeria and Ghana has also been the concern 
of Odeyemi and Nixon’s study, where they noted that in 
spite of Ghana’s uniform benefits across all beneficiaries and 
improvements in equity, there is a pro-rich and pro-urban 
bias in membership.23 The effects of the NHIS on healthcare 
utilisation has also engaged the attention of researchers with 
evidence that individuals enrolled on the scheme are more 
likely to obtain prescriptions, visit clinics and seek formal 
healthcare when sick.24 The conclusion, therefore, is that 
government’s objective of increasing access to the formal 
healthcare sector has at least been partially achieved.24 Issues 
of quality have also been examined with the conclusion that 
there has not been a corresponding improvement in health 
infrastructure and equipment as well as human resource to 
match demand for healthcare under the scheme.17,18
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Attention has also been drawn to limitations and challenges–
predominantly financial sustainability, managerial problems 
and inadequate technology.1,25-28 Among these challenges, 
evidence suggests that delays in reimbursement of health 
facilities resulting in shortages of basic consumables 
continue to be a huge problem to the effective operations of 
health facilities as well as limited space within the hospitals 
to cope with the increasing number of service demands.1 
Agyepong and Adjei12 and Imurana et al,29 identified the 
major implementation problems of the NHIS to include 
poor leadership, corruption, lack of consensus, rapidity and 
politicisation of implementation, lack of participation, poor 
sense of direction, limited understanding and management of 
the political challenges, weakened checks and balances and 
use of short cut.12,29 The political challenges have also been 
referred to by Abiiro and McIntyre in their analysis of the 
one-time premium payment proposal under the NHIS as 
being very controversial and highly politicised within Ghana 
and internationally.30,31 Furthermore, the authors argue that 
so much confusion surrounds stakeholders’ understanding 
of the policy issue. Again, the uncertainties surrounding the 
policy economically means that powerful stakeholders are yet 
to take clear positions on it.30
This underscores the need to explore the political and 




The study is an embedded case study design intended to 
provide in-depth understanding of the main political and 
economic challenges confronting the implementation of 
the NHI scheme as identified by interview subjects. This is 
through an exploratory qualitative inquiry. As our aim was 
to explore and analyse the implementation process of the 
NHIS so as to produce findings derived from real world 
settings, where the phenomena of interest unfold naturally,32 
qualitative case study approach was the most appropriate. 
Implementation was clearly not a simple linear progression 
through a series of pre-determined steps that could be studied 
from the lens of quantitative approaches. The study covered 
the implementation process from 2004-2013.
Study Areas
The study was conducted in selected districts in Northern and 
Southern Ghana. The districts were the Nanumba North and 
South in the Northern region and the Ashiedu Keteke and 
Osu Klottey sub-metros in the Greater Accra Region to reflect 
our aim of achieving a relatively fair representation of the 
north-south divide. The Nanumba North district has a total 
population of 141 584 of which 101 584 is rural while 40 000 
are urban dwellers.33 The Nanumba south district (NSD) has 
a total population of 93 464 of which 16 712 is urban while 
76 752 are rural.33 Ashiedu-Keteke sub-metropolitan district 
assembly is the smallest among the 11 sub-metropolitan 
districts under the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) with 
a population of 117 525 people, which is also the figure for 
urban population.33 Osu Klottey sub-metro is one of 11 sub-
metros within the AMA. It has a total population of 121 723,33 
and entirely urban. 
Our choice of two rural districts in the north as against two 
urban in the south was aimed at ascertaining the extent of 
implementation challenges in resource-constrained areas of 
the north as opposed to resource-endowed areas of the South. 
Thus, within the context of this study, the areas were chosen 
because of the acknowledgement that there are long standing 
inequities in healthcare access in the country, with the south 
benefitting more than the north.34-37 Again, it is reported that 
on almost all socio-economic indices, rural Ghana compares 
unfavourably with urban Ghana with the north-south divide 
the main delineation in terms of poverty.37,38 The Nanumba 
North and South are two rural districts in the Northern 
region with few medical facilities. On the other hand, the 
Osu Klottey and Ashiedu Keteke sub-metropolitans are 
located within Accra, the national capital. Both are urban 
and have better public and private health facilities as well as 
a large number of medical personnel. While earlier studies39 
pointed to the considerable inequalities of health status and 
outcomes between urban and rural areas and the different 
regions of Ghana, recent studies still underlined the broad 
disparities between the North and the South. There is also 
the observation that spatial inequalities in health and socio-
economic development between Southern and Northern 
Ghana and between rural and urban areas34 are still a major 
problem and wider in the regions of Northern Ghana 
compared to Southern Ghana.40
Sampling and Data Collection 
Thirty-three participants were involved in the in-depth 
interviews. Participants were purposefully selected following 
a review of policy documents and other secondary sources 
such as peer reviewed papers, theses, other published 
and unpublished materials, the internet and other grey 
literature as well as through a stakeholder mapping and 
snowballing. Participants included implementing agencies 
and service providers (NHIA; regional offices and DMHISs, 
service providers); politicians; interest groups/professional 
associations; donor partners and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs); and bureaucrats. In the Northern 
region, a total of ten interviews were conducted comprising 
managers and former managers of mutual health insurance 
schemes, government and private health service providers, 
regional and former regional managers of the NHIS, and a 
professional association. In the Greater Accra Region of 
Southern Ghana, a total of seven interviews took place with 
scheme managers, regional and former regional managers and 
government health service providers. The remaining sixteen 
interviewees were national level actors and stakeholders 
and other institutional representations. All the interviews 
but two took place at secured locations – the work places or 
offices of the participants, mostly during working hours. The 
interviews were based on an interview guide and a protocol 
of questions and were specifically adapted for each category 
of participants and centred on the interviewees’ perception 
and experience of the implementation process – including 
how the implementation was organised, actors involved and 
the challenges encountered. Interviews followed a ‘grand-
tour’ approach where respondents were steered towards a 
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small number of key interview destination issues but also 
encouraged to talk in terms which came naturally to them.41 
Additional notes were taken when necessary in order to give 
“richer meaning to the words that were spoken.”42 Besides 
one interviewee that refused to be recorded, a number of 
interviewees requested some parts of the interviews to 
be done off-record. Each interview lasted between 30-60 
minutes with the exception of three that went beyond an hour. 
The first author conducted all the interviews in English. Data 
was collected between June and December 2011 and again in 
February 2012. All interviews were digitally audio recorded, 
transcribed and analysed. Users of health services were not 
included in the interviews as we were more interested in 
the institutional representations and also considered users’ 
perspectives as another set of research. Table shows the 
category of interviewees.
Data Analysis
Transcription was done with the assistance of software called 
Express Scribe. Transcripts were edited for grammatical errors 
without changes to the content. To assist analysis, a coding 
scheme was developed which involved placing extracts from 
the data in categories labelled by theme. Themes were derived 
from the literature review, observations made of recurring 
interview content and included policy design and content, 
political commitment to health funding reform, organization 
of the implementation, challenges to implementation, and 
the perceived impact of policy; themes were subsequently 
split into subthemes, association or relationships between the 
subthemes and a thematic map constructed which allowed 
for analysis of patterns, including evidence of consensus and 
disagreement between different stakeholders. The thematic 
analysis and pattern-building generated from the interview 
data revealed interrelated challenges – mainly political and 
economic confront the implementation of the NHIS in Ghana.
Results
Political Challenges
Respondents identified political challenges as an important 
factor to the successful implementation of the NHIS in Ghana. 
Political variables identified included: (i) over politicisation 
and political interference; and (ii) time and timing of policy 
changes. 
Table. Categories of Respondents
Category No. of Interviewees
Politicians 3
NHIA 5
Regional managers, NHIS 2
DMHISs 6
Service providers 5
NGOs; international actors/development partners 5
Bureaucrats 3
Interests groups/professional associations 2
Research institutes/think tanks 2
Total 33
Abbreviations: NHIA, National Health Insurance Authority; DMHIS, district 
mutual health insurance scheme; NGO, non-governmental organization. 
NHIS, national health insurance schemes.
Source: Field notes.
Over Politicisation and Interference 
Respondents noted how initial implementation in particular 
met many challenges and bottlenecks because of scepticism 
and doubts as a result of politics. 
“There was a lot of politics in the minds of the people 
accepting the health insurance policy because one group felt 
the programme was not theirs…” (Former regional manager, 
September 26, 2011).
“It was also another challenge that the whole thing was being 
politicised because the party in power just loads the whole 
place there with its people” (Trade unionist, September 28, 
2011). 
Supporting the view, a regional manager in Southern Ghana 
blamed the over politicisation on the fact that the policy 
emerged in the heat of politics.
“It started in the heat of a political season. So a lot of political 
connotation was put onto it and from the administrative 
point and then implementation point…a lot of political twist 
is put into it; and that led to the scheme not being attractive 
to a lot of people in the country” (Regional Manager, 
September 26, 2011).
Participants also claimed recruitment of health insurance 
staff was political and not primarily based on criteria of 
competence, experience, skills and qualifications as detailed 
in the guidelines for design and implementation of mutual 
health insurance schemes in Ghana. 
“The political things are there because if there is a change 
of government there is a change of CEO and the CEO is 
changed according to the ruling party and not that you are 
putting up a technical person” (Bureaucrat, August 4, 2011).
“The appointments that are coming into the positions from 
national up to regional and district levels are the positions 
that are owed power…and that for me is a worry because 
if there is a change of government, that means there would 
be changes…it doesn’t give stability to running the system” 
(Bureaucrat, August 4, 2011).
On the strength of the above and others, majority of 
respondents alleged that the scheme has become a vehicle 
for rewarding party members. Respondents expressed the 
view that political clientelism has characterised the NHIS 
operations in terms of recruitment. 
Time and Timing of Policy Changes
Respondents also alluded to the rapidity with regards to 
policy decisions as a major impediment to implementation. 
Though unsurprising as the Ghana scheme is a “moving 
target” and implementation, a continuous process with 
feedback to inform policy direction, this is rather worrisome 
for some stakeholders, especially, service providers who 
argued that such rapidity of policy changes creates anxiety 
and uncertainty. 
“Then these other issues of policies I talked about; sometimes 
they set out to look at one thing then along the line, they 
realise that no they did not analyse it very well and so they 
change it along the way; so it has not been the best” (CHAG, 
August 16, 2011).
“And also, those there with their policies, today they are 
saying this and they are changing, now they want to go to 
capitation, I don’t know which is which; whether they are yet 
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to go or not. They should let us know exactly what they want 
us to do” (District Service Provider, December 16, 2011).
The observations highlight the uncertainty and anxiety 
surrounding the NHIS, which adversely affect implementation. 
Also, this finding highlights the fact that policy-making and 
implementation are embedded as opposed to the differentiation 
that one is political and the other administrative.43-45 
Economic Challenges
In-depth interviews also revealed lack of adequate financial 
resources to sustain the scheme. Interviewees were unanimous 
that the economic conditions of the scheme threaten its 
financial sustainability. Factors identified by participants 
as affecting the economic sustainability and maintaining 
the confidence of subscribers in the system include low 
premiums or contributions; broad exemptions; poor gatekeeper 
enforcement system; culture of curative and hospital-centric 
care; and fraud and corruption. 
Rates of Insurance Premiums/Contributions
Participants across the range of categories were unanimous on 
the impact of the rate of contributions, especially, by informal 
sector employees on the sustainability of the scheme. They 
claimed contributions were rather low as against the cost of 
treatment but even in advanced countries; healthcare services 
are subsidized by governments.
“The sustainability of the health insurance is also a problem 
because the premiums are so low. You know, as at now we 
are told that there is only three months, or four months cover 
(security deposit) instead of like eight to ten months, they 
only have money for four months. If the government does not 
come in, then we don’t know what will happen to the health 
insurance” (Development partner, December 1, 2011).
“In effect, the premiums and all the other issues did not come 
out of rules; but they (NPP) were more concerned about the 
fact that they did not want anybody to pay anything there at 
the healthcare delivery point so that their political argument 
of cash and carry that we (NDC) had could be distinguished; 
but of course, it also immediately showed that the thing was 
not sustainable” (Political Actor, August 17, 2011).
They argued that contributions are not based on actuarial 
calculations or on the cost of treatment but rather based on 
political expediency. An interviewee asserted:
“I remember one of the meetings; I got mad with one of the 
people because we in the premium determination committee; 
while we were then looking at figures and trying to play with 
actuarial figures, one of the members came and said oh, the 
government says everybody should pay between GHS 7.20p 
and 48 GHS. And when I asked what the basis for saying 
that is? He said that oh you see, the Nkoranza one is paying 
3.60p and that one is only for OPD. So if you are adding 
admissions, you just multiply it by two” (Bureaucrat, August 
4, 2011). 
Most participants, however, attributed the challenge to 
income data unreliability in Ghana, which makes it difficult 
to definitively assess and rate for premium contributions. 
This is more so as majority works in the informal sector. 
Practically, contributions are flat across schemes and socio-
economic groups although Act 650 of 2003 and 852 of 2012 
required and still requires contribution according to ability 
and healthcare according to need. 
Participants also noted the disconnection between increases 
in membership, utilisation and increases in revenue and its 
impact on the financial viability of the scheme.
“If you look at the level at which the schemes grow, it tells 
you that unless something serious is done, the current level 
of financing may run out. So some more financing to sustain 
it needs to be added” (District Scheme Manager, July 20, 
2011). 
“The most critical challenge that I will tell you is the 
sustainability of the NHI because it is becoming very 
clear that if we continue the way we are now by next year 
(2013), the Authority will not have enough funds to meet 
its needs. That’s the sustainability component in this thing 
because premiums of the informal sector are really, low” 
(Development Partner, August 26, 2011).
What is clear from the views expressed above are that the low 
contributions create anxiety about the financial stability of 
the scheme and the uncertainty surrounding the long term 
financial sustainability of the programme. It also highlights 
the need to explore additional funding sources. 
Broad Exemptions
Majority of the interview participants viewed the exemption 
policy of the NHIS as being too generous. Only about 30% 
contribute with the broad exemption. 
“When you take the membership, you will see that close to 60 
or 70% do not pay any contribution and so sustainability is 
in doubt” (a consultant, November 20, 2011).
“Creating blanket access to so many people, we should think 
about sustainability; really to ensure that the resources go to 
people who really need them. So, I do not think it is bad but 
the sustainability has become problematic” (Development 
Partner, August 26, 2011).
“It is one of the best in terms of coverage. That is the benefits 
package,….It covers virtually about 90% (sic) (over 95%) of 
all the diseases that affect us in the country; It has built in a 
lot of social mechanisms: children under 18, aged over 70, 
SSNIT pensioners, indigents, pregnant women. So virtually, 
it covers almost 60% of the population…but we are at the 
state of difficulty because cost containment is now becoming 
the biggest issue that we have because of the way that it is 
loaded” (Political Actor, February 14, 2012). 
Much as actors recognised the need to scale up coverage 
so as to achieve universal access in line with policy-makers 
desires and international recommendations, its impact on the 
financial viability needs consideration. 
The blanket exemption raises a number of issues: the policy is 
not target-specific enough as to ensure those who really need 
services get it. It calls into question issues of equity, which is a 
real challenge between the North and the South and rural and 
urban Ghana. This was highlighted by a respondent when he 
asserted that the wife and children of the Director-General of 
the Ghana health service, for instance, should not have the 
same exemption under the policy as the wife and children of 
a poor farmer in a rural community like Gbungbaliga[1] just 
because his wife is a pregnant woman and his children are 
under eighteen years. 
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“His children should not have the same exempt rate with 
somebody who is coming from Gbungbaliga, a village like 
that whose parents are always on the farm; people who can 
genuinely pay, we shouldn’t exempt them. That is the policy 
we have to look at in order to make the scheme sustainable” 
(Regional Manager, July 22, 2011).
Poor Gatekeeper System
It was a prevailing view among participants in the two regions 
that ineffective enforcement of the gatekeeper system is 
undermining the financial sustainability of the scheme. In 
principle, clients need to enter the system at the basic primary 
healthcare level for initial examination and treatment of cases 
such as simple malaria, and should then be referred upwards 
to the appropriate level if necessary. In practice, however, 
clients bypass the lower levels, which put strain on the health 
insurance fund as tariffs are higher at that level. 
“The gatekeeper system is not being followed. You start from 
the primary healthcare to the tertiary but where you have a 
tertiary facility within a metropolis, the clients rather prefer 
going to the tertiary and as soon as they go to the tertiary, we 
pay higher bills” (Regional Manager, July 22, 2011).
There were also concerns regarding moral hazards with non-
restrictions regarding usage. Clients now engage in frivolous 
use of healthcare because there is no payment at the point 
of service as well as non-restriction on how many times a 
subscriber can visit a facility.
“Our arrangement challenge also is that we did not restrict 
use….So again, you are getting things like what we called 
health shopping” (Bureaucrat, August 4, 2011).
“For example, the number of times the person should come 
to hospital in a year. We need to put maybe a check on it 
because now a whole couple of times, people come every 
month. A rash here they will come; a child is coughing, the 
next morning they will come” (Regional Medical Director, 
September 15, 2011).
Medical professionals have a responsibility of enforcing the 
gatekeeper system. However, it could be argued that three 
factors affect their efforts to carry out this responsibility: the 
lack of the requisite technology to ascertain if a client has 
visited primary healthcare (PHC) facility before; availability 
and fair geographical distribution of facilities; and medics 
lacking the incentive to check. 
Culture of Curative and Hospital-Centric Care
Another economic challenge of the NHIS is the culture of 
curative and hospital-centric care that has characterised the 
Ghanaian health system over the years. 
“In Ghana, people focus more on the curative but if you 
can prevent the onset of the disease itself, there would be no 
need to go to the hospital and pay” (Former CEO, NHIA, 
February 28, 2012).
“So, if you do not put in efforts by putting some aspect of 
the money for preventive things, then insurance would not 
be sustainable. Now, we are only treating people when they 
are sick but it is better you also prevent so that they would 
not even access healthcare so that you go and pay for them” 
(Regional Medical Director, September 15, 2011).
Fraud, Abuse and Sustainability
Fraud and abuse emerged as key characteristics of early stage 
implementation. Interviewees provided examples of the 
many dimensions: (i) service providers submitting claims 
and receiving reimbursement for ‘caesarean operations on 
men.’ After conducting clinical audits, “what we saw was that 
men were being reimbursed on caesarean. Can you imagine 
claims bearing men being pregnant?” (Regional Manager, July 
22, 2011). (ii) Rural health facilities with no capacity and 
accreditation for caesarean submitting claims for caesarean 
sections: 
“You see that where in a rural setting, a community clinic 
where almost three-quarters of the claims, the ante-natal 
birth delivery are all caesarean; and you know that is not 
possible. In a rural clinic, they don’t have that capacity. There 
is no caesarean surgeon to do that” (Regional Manager, July 
22, 2011). 
At other times, monies were found to have been paid to 
non-existing providers. Clinical audits in six schemes in the 
Northern region exposed so much malfeasance.
“…we realized that an amount of almost 11 billion old 
Ghana Cedis (equivalent of US$53 538.89/£33 146 201.31) 
was recouped back from the providers to the scheme. This 
shows that these were going to be bad monies, which were 
sitting somewhere, and some people would have pocketed it” 
(Regional Manager, July 22, 2011). 
“Many scheme managers have built houses, many healthcare 
providers have built houses, and many pharmacists have 
built houses in no time because there are too many loopholes 
in the system that people can tap in. I can treat you for one 
disease and bill you for something else that I deem fit; there 
is no way you would know…If I am in the same house with 
you, you are sick, and you do not have a card, I would take 
your sickness … and go and describe it as much as possible, 
bring the medicine to you” (Consultant, November 20, 
2011).
The clinical audit system has since helped to reduce the level 
of fraud and corruption in the scheme. 
Concerns were also expressed about client or provider 
‘shopping,’ a process whereby a subscriber moves from one 
provider to the other with the same sickness within a short 
period of time or within the same day with the aim of securing 
medicine which they then can sell. Even though mechanisms 
have been put in place to check for abuse, the fact that health 
providers are not networked makes it difficult for service 
providers to tell whether a patient has been to another facility 
or what medicines have been prescribed. 
“A client can move from one provider to another within a 
day. He or she collects drugs here in SDA hospital, move 
to Central Hospital, collects drugs, go to Teaching Hospital 
collects drugs, put the drugs together and sell it to a quack 
doctor or a quack chemical store and make money. That 
kind of thing, client shopping … to make money. That is our 
difficulty we are facing and is threatening the scheme” (A 
Regional Manager, July 22, 2011). 
During the interviews, a donor partner pointed to the World 
Bank allocation of US$15 million to put in place a technology 
mechanism to help address the issue as an indication of the 
seriousness of the problem. This was under a project designed 
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in 2007 to be called the Health Insurance Project to help 
ensure efficient systems are put in place for implementation 
of the health insurance. The interviewee explained that:
“Issues of cost containment, issues of actuarial analysis, issues 
of coverage of the poor, issues of electronic claims are all the 
things that are being done under our project to support the 
health insurance scheme” (Donor Partner, December 1, 
2011).
Explanations offered by participants centred on the loopholes 
within the system such as lack of effective technology that 
would enable service providers track clients through the 
health delivery chain. However, it was not confirmed if the 
US$15 million was disbursed to the NHIS.
Discussion 
The findings of the study identify a range of economic and 
political implementation issues threatening the effective 
working of the scheme and its sustainability. However, similar 
economic and political challenges were identified across the 
four DMHISs in the two regions.
Economically, as in common with many developing countries, 
in Ghana a relatively low proportion of the working population 
is in formal employment. Over 80% of the population are 
employed33 in the informal sector. Reliable income assessment 
for premium or contribution purposes is challenging and 
hence subscribers do not pay according to ability as insurance 
principles demand. Meanwhile, the design of the scheme is 
such that there is an inherent vertical equity in contributions, 
where the rich and healthier people are required by law to 
pay more to support the less healthy, poor and vulnerable.15 
However, application of this legal requirement to the large 
informal sector employees and the self-employed has been 
administratively challenging due to fluctuations in their 
incomes and lack of data.15 The consequence of this is low 
revenue as premium contributions are less than 5% of the 
NHIS income. This finding is consistent with Mishra et al 
study in Nepal where they posited that SHI revenue collection 
in large informal sectors is a major economic challenge 
to successful implementation.4 It is also an indication that 
the scheme survives largely on the health insurance levy of 
2.5% tax on goods and services, accounting for about 70% 
of revenues28; making sustainability a challenge as it has not 
been increased in spite of the growth in membership. The low 
level of contributions and what was seen as poorly targeted 
exemptions were argued to be a threat to sustainability, 
which has been noted as a major challenge in large informal 
economies. This is consistent with the challenge of revenue 
collection noted by International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD)/World Bank in low-income 
countries.8 There are also financial pressures resulting from 
problems with the claims management and payment system 
and, especially, provider reimbursement delay, confirming 
findings of other studies.1,46,47 
Health insurances are established to provide financial 
protection against catastrophic healthcare expenditure for 
households. Measures such as exemptions are incorporated 
to ensure the poor, children; the aged and other vulnerable 
groups are covered. In this regard, the Ghana scheme has 
done extremely well. However, evidence from the study shows 
that the exemption policy to a large extent partly contributes 
to the economic challenges facing the scheme. While scaling 
up coverage is important to protect majority of the population 
and to increase universal access, the policy has not been 
target-specific enough resulting in dire economic implication 
in terms of mobilising adequate financial resources. 
Commenting on the economic implications of the exemption 
policy, for instance, the CEO of the NHIA admitted that 
something is fundamentally wrong if premiums constitute 
less than 4% of the NHIS revenue. Contributions “have 
often come in below 5%, it is 3.4% and if premium collection 
accounts for less than 4%, you could tell that there is something 
fundamentally wrong.”[2] Meanwhile, it is acknowledged in 
this study that a country-wide common targeting mechanism 
(CTM) for targeting and enrolling the poor15 is in process 
as way of reforming the exemption policy to make it more 
target-specific.
It was also discovered that as in many LMICs (and indeed 
developed healthcare systems), there is a culture of curative 
and hospital-centric care in the Ghana health service. In other 
low- and middle-income and some developed countries, 
perception of poor quality service at the lower level means 
that secondary and tertiary hospitals often accommodate 
patients that ought to be treated at hospitals at levels below or 
above them. Thus, the challenge as noted in the results section 
is the poor gatekeeping system due to weakened checks and 
balances12,29 and the lack of incentives or motivation on the 
part of service providers to enforce it resulting in what was 
described as client shopping. Yet curative or hospital-centric 
care is expensive all over the world. For instance, in Brazil, 
it is estimated that hospitals absorb nearly 70% of public 
spending on health48 and the case of Ghana might not be 
different. Such huge expenditure definitely impacts on the 
financial sustainability of the health insurance scheme, 
especially, services rendered at secondary and tertiary levels. 
Policy-makers needed to anticipate increases in utilisation 
and incorporated preventive measures. 
In relation to the above, the study also establishes the 
potential of selective enrolment of high risk or less healthy 
individuals into the scheme, which raises average costs on the 
NHIF since coverage remains less than universal. Although, 
since June 2013[3] a pilot of biometric registration and instant 
ID card issue has been in practice, an unintended outcome, 
however, could be that the immediate issuing of cards may 
facilitate self-selection of the sick into the scheme, which 
may in turn increase financial pressure on the programme. 
The consequence is increased cost resulting from increasing 
utilisation paid for from the mostly tax-based financing 
sources, which seems to grow more slowly than enrolment 
and consequent use.13 
Problems of fraud and corruption were argued to be 
particularly evident in the early stages of implementation 
of the Scheme (in the form of what participants described 
as client/provider shopping) with some indication from 
interviewees that there has been improvement in more recent 
years. The study acknowledges that fraud is a challenge for 
insurance systems the world over. Steps taken to prevent and 
identify these problems, include the mentioned US$15 million 
World Bank grant to boost the technology capacity of the 
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authority and providers and to facilitate electronic processing 
of claims and to help track visits by subscribers. The problem, 
meanwhile, is whether the fund was disbursed. Findings of the 
study still suggest a continuing lack of effective technological 
monitoring and control mechanisms. The cumulative effect 
of this is the exploitation of the weaknesses of the inefficient 
technological monitoring and control mechanisms by some 
service providers and scheme managers to the disadvantage 
of the scheme in terms of financial sustainability and poor 
gatekeeping system. This results in abuse of the system 
financially but also increases the tendency of moral hazards. 
Politically, there is government’s reluctance to increase 
the health insurance levy since implementation due to 
fear of political backlash. Meanwhile, as noted by Carrin 
et al,49 and Doetinchem et al,50 government stewardship 
is key to the success of such systems and the welfare of the 
population.49,50 Political nepotism has also come for mention, 
especially, with regards to recruitment procedures where the 
scheme has become vehicle for political rewards of party 
loyalists. This has undermined the capacity and capability 
of scheme staff in terms of skills, understanding of policy 
standards and goals and the ability to develop micro-level 
programmes in response to macro-level plans. Prior studies 
of implementation challenges of the NHIS in Ghana have 
also identified politicisation as a major challenge resulting in 
people not joining the scheme because they either associate 
the scheme with a political party or a particular politician 
in office.28 Added to this is the rapidity with which policy 
decisions are made as implementation progresses. Indeed, as 
suggested by an earlier study, the lack of policy clarity and 
frequent changes in the policy made the scheme confusing 
to potential members,28 thereby undermining enrolment and 
renewals and hence the finances of the scheme.
Policy Implications
Within the context of this study and other research on the NHIS 
in Ghana and available data, it is suggested that addressing 
political and economic challenges of the NHIS in Ghana 
requires a policy review of the exemption policy to make it 
more target-specific. This has the potential of ensuring those 
who really cannot afford get services. Contributions from the 
informal sector employees also need to be marginally adjusted 
so as to ensure the government continue to subsidize the cost 
of healthcare in Ghana. It is also the view of this study that 
the health insurance levy should be reviewed upwards by at 
least 1.5%-2.0% as a way of matching revenue with increased 
utilisation and membership. Some percentage of taxes could 
also be levied on alcohol and Tobacco as is done in countries 
such as Belgium and the United Kingdom and the proceeds 
channelled into the NHIF as additional sources of funding.
To deal with the political challenges, the study takes the view 
that recruitment into the scheme should reflect competence 
and experience rather than other considerations such as 
political affiliation as a way of dealing with the capacity 
challenges confronting the scheme.
Limitations of the Study
We acknowledge that the findings of the study cannot be 
generalised beyond the four case study areas as the study 
covered two mutual schemes each in the Greater Accra 
and Northern regions of southern and northern Ghana, 
respectively. Finally, the study covered the implementation 
process from 2004-2013 but it is acknowledged that 
implementation is a complex process that can be affected by 
both endogenous and exogenous factors beyond the control 
of implementing officials.
Conclusion
The study explored the implementation of the NHIS in 
selected districts in southern and northern Ghana using two 
mutual schemes each in Greater Accra and Northern regions, 
respectively, to demonstrate the implementation challenges. 
The study establishes that political and economic factors have 
influenced the implementation process and the degree to 
which the policy has been implemented as intended. This is 
not surprising as the study establishes that there is a synergy 
between implementation and politics. Implementation cannot 
be devoid of politics as it requires the necessary political 
authority to succeed. Thus, to achieve UHC under the NHIS 
requires political stewardship. Political leadership has the 
responsibility to build trust and confidence in the system by 
providing the necessary resources and backing with minimal 
interference in the operations. 
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Endnotes
[1] Gbungbaliga is a poor farming rural community in the NSD of the Northern 
Region of Ghana.
[2] Interview in October 2012 on http://www.myjoyonline.com.
[3] Press Release: NHIA Begins Biometric Registration and instant NHIS ID 
Issuance at: http://www.nhis.gov.gh/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/30(1).pdf. Last 
accessed on August 1, 2013. 
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